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Introduction	  
International climate change governance has in recent years fragmented to a plethora of 
forums outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
process where climate change and closely related issues are discussed (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 
and McGee, 2013). Some of them are multilateral forums that are indirectly addressing 
climate change through addressing energy; in the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development and the biannual series of International Renewable Energy Conferences  
(IRECs) starting in Bonn in 2004. Others are ‘minilateral’2 forums, like the Asia Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Energy and Climate (APP), the G8 or the Major Economies 
Meetings/Forums (MEM/F), that include only a small number of countries and while 
addressing climate change directly do so with a much more limited scope compared to the 
UNFCCC process (focusing for example primarily on technical solutions and mitigation and 
not adaptation).  
These two categories of governance forums that address climate change directly or 
indirectly outside the UNFCCC regime can be seen as manifestations of fragmentation of this 
regime.3 Both categories face legitimacy challenges but for different reasons. The multilateral 
forums that address energy meet considerable resistance towards any energy governance at 
the global level (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2012). This 
resistance means that global governance of energy has low or no legitimacy or justified 
authority, and the reason is most probably rooted in the historical links between energy and 
national security. The minilateral forums have met scepticism and resistance because they are 
seen as obstructing or thwarting the one process many states and civil society observers 
consider to be the only legitimate forum for addressing climate change, the UNFCCC 
                                                
1 This is an early draft where the analysis of the material is not yet finished, neither is interpreting and writing up 
2  The term minilateralism was coined by Moisés Naím, editor in chief of Foreign Policy in his 2009 article 
“Minilateralism - The magic number to get real international action” He argues that getting close to 200 
countries to agree to anything substantial is futile, instead he advocates minilateralism; ”a smarter, more targeted 
approach: We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest 
possible impact on solving a particular problem”.   
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism?page=0,0  
3 For a discussion on the concept of fragmentation in international governance see Biermann et al (Biermann et 
al., 2009) 
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(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013).4 This means that there are issues about the 
appropriate home for global climate change governance and for global energy governance it is 
a question of whether it is appropriate at all.  
There has been some work done on analysing the role and influence of a few of these 
forums the ‘fragmented landscape’ such as the APP (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 
2009; McGee and Taplin, 2008, 2009; Vihma, 2009), the G8 (Karlsson, 2009; Lesage et al., 
2009), and the CSD  (Kaasa, 2005; Wagner, 2003). Other forums such as the MEM/Fs and the 
IRECs have received little attention in the literature. However, there is almost no systematic 
analysis of the legitimacy of these forums, individually or in a comparative sense and yet 
legitimacy is an important source of influence in global governance, see e.g. (Clark, 2005; 
Franck, 1990) in addition to being an important normative evaluative criterion (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 2009). The only exception we are aware of is a comparative analysis 
by Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee (2013) of the APP, G8 and MEM forums using a 
normative framework of legitimacy. What really matters in the practice of global governance, 
is however, subjective legitimacy, the perception of a forum has having justified authority in 
the eyes of those whose behaviour they are aiming to influence e.g. states, but also in the eyes 
of those take upon themselves a role of account holders towards the governments such as civil 
society observers. Finally, from a democratic perspective, it is the legitimacy of global 
governance towards the ones whom it is supposed to serve, the global public at large, that 
should be important.  
Normative legitimacy is already a challenging composite concept with many 
subcomponents (varying with authors and perspective). Subjective legitimacy is in some ways 
considerably more challenging to analyse, particularly in a global governance context, as the 
demands for empirical data collection becomes daunting. One can imagine surveys, deep 
interviews where one asks about perceptions of legitimacy of different governance forums 
who should be asked? This paper takes a different approach. It uses elite debates in the media 
as one analytical entry point to such sociological legitimacy. Our primary research questions 
are: 
Does the media play a role in (de)-legitimising specific forums of global governance (and if 
so does it differ between countries/newspapers)? 
What are the major criteria that, explicitly or implicitly, can be found in the material for (de)-
legitimising global governance forums and their outcomes? 
The empirical basis is a large sample of newspaper editorials and articles from nine 
leading newspapers in seven different countries (Finland, India, Laos, Norway, South Africa, 
UK and USA) covering 16 separate minilateral and multilateral climate change meetings from 
June 2004 to December 2009. We made a quantitative analysis of how much coverage each 
forum received and a qualitative analysis of argumentation around the legitimacy, or lack of 
legitimacy, of the various governance forums and their outcomes. As the articles do not 
explicitly discuss of the concept of legitimacy we had to analyse the material for instances 
where the text is implicitly linked to this concept and the themes we associate with it.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The following gives a brief overview of the theoretical 
context on legitimacy where our inquiry is founded; we then proceed to give a brief 
description of the energy and climate change governance forums we focus our analysis on 
followed by a section on our methodology. In the result section we discuss the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis respectively, followed by an (as yet) short conclusion.  
                                                
4 For example, some of the minilateral forums such as the APP, have been strongly criticized by civil society 
and many developing countries who judge them as illegitimate governance forums.  
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Theoretical	  starting	  points	  on	  legitimacy,	  accountability	  and	  the	  media	  
The subjective dimension of legitimacy covers the societal acceptance of political decisions 
and political orders (Zürn 2004). Legitimacy in a subjective connotation – what is seen as 
justified authority (Bodansky, 1999) in the eyes of key decision makers in states and other 
actors (the global public) – is in the areas of global governance of energy and climate change 
that is the focus of this paper.  
Legitimacy, in this subjective dimension, is not static over time. Clark (2005:7) looks 
at international society “as a set of historically changing principles of legitimacy”. These 
principles extend beyond international law, do not have to be necessarily expressed in 
institutions and are often “too informal to be classified as rules” (Clark, 2005:7).  
Legitimacy is seen as a major tool to reduce undue dominance of the powerful, 
principles of legitimacy in the world order created after the second world war stands a 
counterweight towards power. However, legitimacy and power are still closely intertwined; 
legitimacy both constrains and enables power. However, it is very difficult to conceptualize 
the precise nature of this relationship: 
“the spectrum of opinion ranges from some absolute opposition between power 
and legitimacy at the one end (whereby the generation of legitimacy is 
autonomous from the power relations that it ‘legitimizes’), to the opposite end 
where legitimacy is reduced to the preferences of those hegemonic forces that are 
thought to manufacture it in the first place” (Clark, 2005:20). 
Whatever endpoint of this spectrum matches reality best, it is clear that the powerful in the 
international community engage in efforts to change the principles of legitimacy as legitimacy 
makes power more effective and its maintenance less costly (Clark, 2005).5 Indeed, all 
international actors “are engaged in endless strategies of legitimation, in order to present 
certain activities or actions legitimate” (Clark, 2005:2).  
In the literature that discusses subjective legitimacy in relation to global governance, 
such as the development of international norms, it is the legitimacy in the eyes of states that 
stands in focus. The reason for this is that international rules (norms, laws etc.) exert their 
most powerful pull towards compliance when they are generally perceived to be both 
legitimate and just (Franck, 1990). In the absence of possibilities of enforcement – which is 
the case for most international norms - such pull is vital. In Franck’s (1990:44) formulation: 
“the degree to which a rule is obeyed affects the degree to which it is recognizable as a valid 
obligation” and “the extent to which a rule is recognizable as a legitimate obligation affects 
the extent to which it is obeyed”. It is, however, not only the legitimacy of global governance 
in the eyes of states that matter. It also matters how legitimate this governance is for citizens 
of those states who in the end will experience the impact of governance, or more often suffer 
the consequences of its absence, weakness or ineffectiveness. We can argue this from a 
normative standpoint if we adhere to values of democracy. We can also argue this from an 
effectiveness standpoint, particularly in areas such as global climate change governance 
where governments will need the support and cooperation of their citizens and companies to 
implement international agreements.  
Media has become an influential actor between the people and their possibility to 
legitimize authority and to hold those in authority to account. This means that way that 
governance is framed, discussed and judged in the media becomes important. This is taken for 
                                                
5 For example, under the Bush doctrine “[p]ower was to become the new legitimacy, and not something that 
needed to be negotiated into a legitimate order” (Clark, 2005:231). 
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granted for domestic governance but it is less discussed for global governance.6 And yet, in 
the (academic) discussion of the democratic deficit in global governance (or not), see for 
example Koenig-Archibugi (2010), Archibugi (2004), and Zürn (2004) For Habermas the 
major source of legitimacy in law making is “public acceptance of procedural responsiveness, 
not by the actual responsiveness of pieces of legislation to the substance of public opinion on 
an issue” (Dryzek, 2001:657). Thus, for Harbemas the perception of the public that law-
making processes (in this case of international law) are seen as legitimate expressions of 
authority are more important than that the details of the norms are accepted.  
As most global governance is made in consensus, thus at least theoretically with each 
country having a veto, it could be argued that the democratic deficit is irrelevant if most states 
taking part are democratic. The domestic accountability mechanisms within the democratic 
system would ensure that citizens indirectly can have a say about e.g. the type of international 
norms that are developed. However, the accountability of (democratic) states to their 
constituents on international issues is often not comparable to domestic issues. Scholte (2002) 
asserts that public participation and public accountability at the national level are generally 
weak in each area of global policy.7 There is at best only sparse consultation between the 
government and the public or elected representatives about policies on global issues and 
parliaments have “generally exercised only lax oversight of their state’s involvement in 
multilateral conferences, transgovernmental networks, and suprastate agencies” (Scholte, 
2002:290-291). Zürn (2004) refers to this method of decision-making among governmental 
representatives (mainly cabinet ministers) from different countries who coordinate their 
policies internationally as ‘executive multilateralism’.  
If this situation of executive multilateralism is going to change into one where there is 
more open debate about a government’s foreign policy including its contribution to the 
development of international norms (legal and non-legal) then the media would be a key actor 
to facilitate this. If the link between the electorate and those who negotiate international 
norms, that at best, follow instructions from their political leadership is weak then there is a 
key role for media to fill in the first hand an information gap of what is going on in global 
governance and then to identify and publicise discrepancies between words and actions and 
holding politicians responsible for averse consequences of their actions in for example global 
climate governance. For most citizens (all those not engaged in e.g. international NGOs 
through which they may receive more information) the media is the main potential 
information channel on global governance and their own government’s role in that. This 
means that not only the news reporting of the ‘facts’ of global governance but also the 
evaluative judgments of that governance, its process and outcome, and their government’s 
contribution to it could play an important role in to what degree of legitimacy the public 
ascribes specific parts of that governance. Our analysis of how the media discusses various 
forums of global energy and climate governance and their outcome examines what we can 
expect of media in contributing to some kind of (elite) societal discourse on global energy and 
climate governance and thereby enable at least some citizens (those who read the broad sheet 
newspapers) be informed sufficiently to form their own views of the legitimacy of global 
governance  
As starting point for searching after components of governance processes or outcomes 
in global governance that make it legitimate in the eyes of the editors, commentators or 
                                                
6 Moravczik (2004:344) on the other hand claims even in democracies “individual citizens remain ‘rationally 
ignorant or non-participatory with regard to most issues, most of the time” 
7 In cases of ‘less’ or non-democratic states the situation is of course even less conducive towards such ‘internal’ 
accountability. 
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journalists, we use a framework of normative legitimacy of international norms developed by 
one of the authors by reviewing normative literature on legitimacy in global governance 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 2009). This framework identifies nine components of 
legitimacy in three categories: source based legitimacy (tradition, expertise, discourse), 
procedural legitimacy (governmental participation, non-governmental participation, 
transparency, accountability), and substantive legitimacy (equity, effectiveness). The first two 
categories, source based and procedural legitimacy, comprise input legitimacy while 
substantive legitimacy comprise output legitimacy in the usage of Scharpf (1999).  
Using such a normative framework as a starting point for analysing sociological 
legitimacy builds on the assumption that is a strong connection between normative and 
sociological forms of legitimacy, as argued by e.g. Black (2008). On the one hand what is 
identified as sources of normative legitimacy is often grounded in normative theories that 
reflect views in society (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013). On the other hand 
dominant normative theories of legitimacy should also have an influence on what factors are 
considered to provide legitimacy in societies.  
 
 
Multiple	  multilateral	  and	  minilateral	  governance	  forums	  
In the subsections below we give a brief introduction to each of the energy or climate change 
governance forums included in the analysis. We include some information on what was on the 
agenda of some of their respective meetings that were covered in the analysis, and end with a 
brief comparison of the governance forums, their similarities and differences. 
 
The	  UN-­‐based	  climate	  regime	  
The issue of climate change rose on the global agenda first through the negotiations of the 
UNFCCC adopted in 1992. The primary aim of which is to stabilize the concentration of 
greenhouse gases “at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human-induced) 
interference with the climate system...” (United Nations, 1992). The Convention, however, 
contains only very general guidelines on how this is to be achieved and this includes 
references to the energy sector which is just mentioned among several other sectors where 
Parties should promote technologies, practices and processes which reduce or prevent green 
house gas emissions (United Nations, 1992: Article 4.1c). The Convention also contained 
principles, such as the principle on common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDR) that have continued to follow the negotiations on further agreements ever 
since. The Kyoto Protocol that was adopted in 1997, entered into force in 2004 and had a 
commitment period running from 2008 to 2012 set out specific obligations in emission 
reductions for developed countries. These countries are given a lot freedom in how they 
achieve these. The Protocol, however, outlines actions for several sectors, including for 
energy where Parties should elaborate policies on energy efficiency as well as promote 
renewable energy (United Nations, 1997: Article 2). Annex 1 parties are also given the option 
to achieve their reduction commitments partly in other countries through the three 
mechanisms designed to improve the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation; joint 
implementation, the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading (UNFCCC, 
2003). From the 2005 COP in Montreal and onwards the Parties to the UNFCCC and the KP 
have negotiated on what should come after 2012. A road map for these negotiations was 
adopted in Bali in 2007 giving a deadline for the 2009 Conference of the Parties (COP) that 
came to be held in Copenhagen for concluding these negotiations. The Copenhagen COP 
failed to adopt a formal agreement, the Copenhagen Accord that was negotiated in the last 
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days and nights by a small group of countries, was rejected by some Parties but in the 
following year its major provisions were accepted as an official COP decisions and very much 
framed further negotiations that now have a deadline of 2015 for adopting an agreement with 
‘legal force’ that should come into effect by 2020.  
 
The	  Commission	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  
The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was set up in the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro 
and it ‘died in the same city in the 2012 Rio+20 conference when governments decided to 
create another institution at a higher level in the UN system. It was set up as a functional 
commission under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and was to, among other 
things, monitor the implementation of the outcomes of UNCED. In its two-week long 
meetings every year governments worked their way through the chapters of Agenda 21, a few 
at a time, gathering ministers for placing the final touches on its recommendations. In an 
effort to give the CSD a re-birth the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 
changed its mode of work to some degree including institutionalised regional preparation 
meetings and reducing the meetings where decisions were formally negotiated to every two 
years (leaving the other year’s meeting for reviewing progress on implementation of passed 
decisions, learning from each other etc.).  
The CSD-9 in 2001 was the first occasion that energy in the broader connotation 
‘energy for sustainable development’ was discussed as a separate agenda item at the inter-
governmental level (WEHAB Working Group, 2002). The adopted decision energy 
accessibility, energy efficiency, renewable energy, advanced fossil fuel technologies, nuclear 
energy technologies, rural energy, energy and transport albeit all in very general terms 
providing a long list of options for actions but did not include any targets, implementation 
mechanism or plan of action (Commission on Sustainable Development, 2001). The topic of 
‘energy for sustainable development’ — together with the air pollution/atmosphere, industrial 
development and climate change — was again on the agenda in the CSD ‘cycle’ in 
2006/2007. This time the negotiations broke down at 4 am on the last morning. At the end of 
that day the Chair presented a ‘take it or leave it’ compromise text which G77/China and USA 
accepted but which the EU and Switzerland rejected. It was the negotiations on energy that 
stood to blame for the first CSD without an adopted decision text. The negotiations richly 
illustrated governments’ general reluctance towards institutionalizing global cooperation on 
energy issues. Even cooperation around the otherwise uncontroversial issue of energy 
efficiency was highly contentious such as whether there should be “cooperation”, “efforts” or 
even “an international agreement”, and whether cooperation should include information and 
research or also labeling and even regulatory cooperation. The most contentious institutional 
issue, however, became if and how to review the implementation of the energy related CSD 
and WSSD decisions. The weak writing on the review in the final compromise text was one 
of the reasons that the EU refused to accept it.8  
 
International	  Renewable	  Energy	  Conferences	  	  
Various EU members wanted the UN system to address energy more explicitly, particularly to 
promote renewable energy. Because of this the EU pushed hard for a strong text on renewable 
                                                
8 For an in depth analysis of the energy negotiations at the CSD, see Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen, 2010).  
-Draft- Please do not cite without permission of the authors! 
Page 7 of 29 
 
energy in the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002. 
While they achieved a partial success in that the text referred to the goal of a higher 
proportion of renewable energy in the global energy mix, it was a hard fight and they wanted 
more. Perhaps partially due to this the EU set up the Johannesburg Renewable Energy 
Coalition (JREC) after the WSSD in 2002 and Germany initiated the first of a series of 
international high level political conferences on renewable energy (Bonn 2004, Beijing 2005, 
Washington DC 2008, New Delhi 2010, Abu Dhabi 2013). These conferences are hosted by 
each respective country and convened by the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century (REN21) a multistakeholder organisation promoting renewable energy. The 
conferences were open to diverse actors interested in renewable energy and the one in 
Washington D.C included a sizeable fair of renewable energy companies. Both the conference 
in Bonn and Washington D.C included in their outcome a politicla declaration and a list of 
action and commitments (or pledges) by participating states and non-state actors. Initially the 
implementation of these commitments were followed by REN21.  
 
The	  Group	  of	  Eight	  
The period after the USA rejected the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 2001 was a challenging one in 
global climate governance. The question of how to get the USA back into the multilateral 
efforts, indeed into any efforts to address climate change, was everyone’s concern even more 
so when preparations for the negotiations on how to negotiate what would come after the first 
commitment period of the KP started (decisions on this were scheduled for the December 
2005 COP in Montreal). This was the backdrop when the UK presidency of the G8 in 2005 
was approaching. Prime Minister Blair who had a documented strong interest in the climate 
change issue saw an opportunity to use the G8 to work on two fronts; enticing the USA to 
become sufficiently constructively engaged with the issue to come back to the UN based 
negotiation process on future commitments, and to strengthen the overall position of the issue 
in global (and national) governance.  
The G8 as forum of leaders of economically powerful nations, currently comprising 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US Heads of 
state of the G8 countries have met annually since the mid-1970s to discuss issues regarding 
the global economy. It is a forum that takes its pride in its informality allowing leaders to 
discuss issues in private. The outcomes are in the form of declarations outlining commitments 
for action of the members individually and jointly and occasionally initiate short-term task 
forces to investigate particular issues. The G8 is not institutionalised, it has no constitution, no 
secretariat, nor a common communication tool, such as a website (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
McGee, 2013). 
The G8, then G7, discussed climate change as early as 1989 in their Paris summit 
where they “strongly advocate common efforts” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (G8, 
1989) and energy conservation had already been on the agenda in several summits 
particularly in the 1970s due to the oil crises. The early G8 references to climate change were 
very general and mostly referring to the development of international law within the UN 
system. They did not see their own group — the G8 — as an additional actor on the issue.9 
The context was quite different at the first G8 summit where climate change moved to the top 
of the agenda under the UK presidency in 2005.  The summit was held at Gleneagles on 6-8 
                                                
9 More detailed discussions could of course take place at the ministerial, rather than Head of State, level. The 
environmental ministers of the G8 countries met first in 1992 and then regularly since 1994, while energy 
minister’s meetings started only in 1999 (Bailin, 2005). 
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July, and was in addition to the G8 leaders attended by, for certain sections of the meeting, the 
leaders of the so called +5 countries (China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil) and an 
additional six African countries as well as the leaders of the African Union, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Tragically, much of the focus shifted away from the climate change agenda point due to the 
terror attack in the London Subway that happened during the G8 Gleneagles summit. The 
documents that came out included a Communiqué on Climate Change, Energy and 
Sustainable Development with a shorter ‘declaration’ part that summarizes the actions to be 
taken, and a longer and more detailed Plan of Action (PoA). The text weaves the concerns of 
energy security and climate change together and the mitigation actions they commit 
themselves to do, and urge other actors to take on, revolve largely around making energy 
production and consumption cleaner through a variety of measures such as promoting 
innovation, technology transfer, regulatory frameworks and educate energy users (G8, 2005). 
The actions which the G8 leaders commit themselves to include both rather general and very 
specific ones, some of them are clearly envisioned for national policy in each G8 country, but 
quite a number of them implicate in one way or another international actors, primarily the 
IEA and WB but also international partnerships (G8, 2005).  
The UK host was pushing for the climate change work of the G8 to go beyond the one off 
summit Communiqué and rather make it into a process. They managed to secure agreement 
for starting a three-year Dialogue on Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development, 
later called the Gleneagles Dialogue to which other countries were invited. Its mandate was to 
(G8, 2005).  
a) address the strategic challenge of transforming our energy systems to create a more 
secure and sustainable future; 
b) monitor implementation of the commitments made in the Gleneagles Plan of Action 
and explore how to build on this progress; and  
c) share best practice between participating governments.  
Blair offered to hose the first of its meetings later in 2005. Environment and energy ministers 
and senior officials attended that meeting as well as the subsequent ones from the G8 
countries, the +5 countries, and a few others. In addition, international organizations like the 
WB, UNFCCC, IPCC, IEA and UNEP were represented. Subsequent meetings of the 
Dialogue took place in Mexico (2006), Germany (2007) and Japan (2008). In parallel the G8 
moved on to new presidencies, with Russia in 2006 focusing on energy security rather than 
climate change, Germany in 2007 managing to push the outcome language on climate change 
a notch higher and Japan in 2008 receiving the report from the Dialogue and keeping a high 
focus on climate change in the agenda of the Hokkaido Toyako summit.  
 
The	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  on	  Clean	  Energy	  and	  Climate10	  	  
The APP was launched in 2005 with six member countries: Australia, China, India, South 
Korea, Japan, and the US (Canada joined in 2007) who described the partnership as an 
“innovative and a fresh new development for the environment, energy security and for 
economic development in the region.” It aimed to have voluntary goals that would be 
determined domestically. Eight industry-based task forces were set up with representatives 
from government, research organizations, and corporations. The job of the task forces was to 
formulate plans projects on technology development and information sharing. By 2009, the 
total number of approved projects was 175. but by 2008, the APP had received only US$200 
                                                
10 This section and the following draws heavily on Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee (2013).  
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million in public funding from its partner governments, the expectation was that the private 
sector should provide significant funding for the implementation of APP projects.  In April 
2011, it was announced that the partnership would cease and that its unfinished projects being 
transferred to other forums. 
 
The	  Major	  Economies	  Meetings/Major	  Economies	  Forum	  
The George W. Bush administration of USA announced in 2007 that it would organise the 
Major Economies Meetings (MEM), that would include fifteen of the major greenhouse gas 
emitting economies. The MEM meetings were to “complement” the UN process. Their 
purpose was to develop a long-term global goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Each  
country could then establish mid-term national targets and programs based on national 
circumstances. The meetings proposed that its participating countries develop national 
commitments to promote clean energy technologies. The USA was then prepared to facilitate 
international financial institutions providing low-cost financing for this. The MEM adopted 
the APP approach of facilitating meetings of representatives from industry sectors such as 
power generation and energy production. The MEM process concluded with a meeting 
following the 2008 G8 summit in Japan in which it produced a declaration indicating that 
developed nations would implement economy-wide mid-term goals and actions to achieve 
absolute emission reductions. There was still an option, however, for countries to focus on 
“stopping the growth” of emissions rather than achieving absolute emission reductions. In 
March 2009, the Obama administration re-launched the MEM process as the Major 
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF).  
 
Comparing	  governance	  forums	  
The governance forums on energy and/or climate change described above share that they have 
an intergovernmental character at their core, that is it is states which are the major actor as is 
traditionally expected in global governance. They also share the objective of addressing 
climate change whether directly or indirectly by promoting low-carbon energy options (these 
alternative energy options can also provide a number of other benefits). But here the 
similarities end. The forums differ along several dimensions; the most obvious are the 
following. First, the number of states that are taking part varies from the almost universal 
multilaterlism of the UNFCCC and the CSD11 to the highly selective minilateralism of the 
MEM, APP and the G8. Secondly, some of the forums are purely intergovernmental such as 
the UNFCCC, the CSD and the G8, while others bring in a significant role for the private 
sector such as the APP and the IRECs. Thirdly, they differ significantly in their openess to 
civil society observers and more generally in the transparency of their decision-making 
process from the highly intransparent G8 meetings via the UN based meetings where 
observers can be admitted to the proceedings yet usually not to the most sensitive 
negotiations, to the IREC where both governmental and non-governmental actors are ‘made 
equal’ in the implementation plans. Fourthly, they differ in the type of outcomes they produce 
including their ‘hardness’ on the hard-soft law continuum and thus vary in their degree of 
precision, obligation and delegation.12 The only process that can generate international hard 
law is the UNFCCC, while the other processes rely on developing soft law in some form or 
                                                
11 Formally the CSD has 53 member states on a rotating basis but in practice can all states take part in the 
meetings and the negotiations.  
12 For a discussion on the hard-soft law continuum see Abbott and Snidal (2000), Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
Vihma (2009) and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2011). 
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are used to support the development of hard law in the UNFCCC. The implementation plans 
of the IRECs can hardly even be called soft law as they are all self-defined voluntary 
commitments although they form part of a collective action plan by aggregation. The degree 
of monitoring and follow-up of commitments vary from zero in the G8 (in the MEM no 
commitments are made) to obligatory regular national communications under the UNFCCC 
(and the KP where they are also peer-reviewed).  
 
 Analyzing	   media	   coverage	   of	   climate	   governance:	   context,	   objective	   and	  methodology	  
William Ruckelshaus – first US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator – has 
said, “[i]f the public isn’t adequately informed [about climate change], it’s difficult for them 
to make demands on government, even when it’s in their own interest” Ruckelshaus (2004) 
quoted in Boykoff  and Roberts (Boykoff and Roberts, 2007). But how this information is 
interpreted and translated into decisions and potential behavioral change is complex, dynamic 
and contested. 
Studies have found that the public learns a large amount about science through 
consuming mass media news (Wilson, 1995). The daily political agenda in democracies is 
influenced to a large degree by what mass media writes about, it is of course a symbiotic 
relationship where journalists depend on access to top politicians and politicians depend on 
favourable media coverage. In the case of climate change, mass media coverage of the issue 
of climate change is very fluctuating; coverage tends to rise when there is some noteworthy 
event such as the Al Gore documentary or the release of the Stern report or a climate 
negotiation meeting, with the amount relating to the importance of the meeting in question in 
the negotiation process. The Copenhagen COP was exceptional in building up media attention 
on the issue as seen in the graph below. Max Boykoff is the researcher that with his team has 
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Painter (2010) has done a thorough analysis of the media coverage of the Copenhagen COP, 
analysing which journalists attended and what their coverage focused on. According to 
Painter’s report 3880 journalists from 119 countries where registered to attend the UN 
meeting, an unprecedented number in the history of the climate negotiations (Painter, 2010). 
Notable was also the substantial number, some 600, journalists from developing countries 
attending the negotiations. 
Most media studies of how climate change is portrayed have looked on English 
language, primarily print media in the US with a focus on the bias of the ‘balanced approach’ 
to the coverage of the science of climate change has had. One explanation to the lack of 
studies is that radio and TV dominates the media landscapes in developing countries and that 
is inherently harder for researchers to collect and analyse data, especially if it is in non-
English language. There are studies from other countries, see for example Boykoff’s (2010) 
study of how Indian mass media portray climate change. The focus, however, of these studies 
is again on how climate change science is depicted. The only studies we have found global 
climate governance process is the center of the analysis is a paper on the coverage of the COP 
meeting in Cancun in US media (Boykoff, 2012). Our study thus contributes to a considerable 
gap in this respect.   
The guiding research question for our paper is, as mentioned above: 
1. Does the media play a role in (de)-legitimising specific forums of global governance 
(and if so does it differ between countries/newspapers? 
2. What are the major criteria that, explicitly or implicitly, can be found in the material in 
the media for (de)-legitimising global governance forums and their outcomes? 
In order to answer these two questions we analyse editorials and articles which wrote about 
major global climate change and energy governance events that were collected from a total of 
seven newspapers published in six different countries (see Table 1). The countries were 
selected to cover different socio-economic, geographical and political differences. However, 
the sample is still limited, confined to Nordic languages and English and narrowed by archive 
availability.13 The sample can therefore not claim by far global representativity.14 In five 
countries one major morning daily was selected based on wide circulation with the exception 
of Laos where due to language we had to select the Vientiane Times that has a relatively 
small circulation. In two countries, USA and UK, two morning daily newspapers were 
selected covering different political profiles (liberal and conservative).  
  
                                                
13 For example, initially we had planned to have at least two newspapers with different political colours from 
each country but for small countries one paper was overly dominating in circulation and/or it was difficult to 
identify an obvious political antagonist among the morning papers. Yet in other cases the candidates for a second 
paper could not be accessed through the internet or available library sources.  
14 For this version of the paper we have not yet analysed the material from the Helsingen Sanomat (Finland) and 
the Times (UK).  
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Table 1. Countries and newspapers included in comparative media analysis of global 
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Table 2. Meetings in global energy or climate change governance analysed during 2004-2009 in 
chronological order.  
Meeting name, place and major characteristic Date 
International Conference for Renewable Energies (Renewables 2004)  
Bonn, Germany 
The first of what become biannual multistakeholder international conferences on renewable 
energy 
1-4 June 2004 
G8 Summit (G8 2005) 
Gleneagles, UK  
The first G8 summit that put climate change high on the agenda and launched the three year 
Gleneagles Dialogue 
6-8 July 2005 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP 0) The announcement 
(not meeting) of  an intergovernmental partnership focused on working with the private 
sector partnership made during an ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Laos. 
27 July 2005 
 
11th Conferences of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP 11) 
Montreal, Canada 
Launch of the discussions on what should come after the first commitment period of the KP 
28 Nov-9 Dec 
2005      
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: Launch and Inaugural 
Ministerial meeting (APP 1) 
Sydney, Australia 
12 Jan 2006 
 
12th Conferences of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP 12) 
Nairobi, Kenya 
6-17 Nov 
2006           
The 15th Session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, (CSD 15) 
New York, USA  
The CSD addressed climate change and energy but negotiations failed, there was no 
outcome document.  
1-11 May 2007 
 
G8 Summit (G8 2007) 
Heiligendamm, Germany 
Climate change high on the agenda. 
6-8 June 2007 
 
Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM I) 
Washington DC, USA  
The first in a series of meetings initiated by President G. W. Bush 
27-28 Sep 
2007                
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: Second Ministerial 
Meeting (APP 2) 
New Delhi, India  
15 Oct 
2007                  
13th Conferences of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP 13) 
Bali, Indonesia 
Adoption of the Bali Action Plan; the negotiation mandate for a post 2012 agreement when 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period expired. 
3-14 Dec 
2007                  
            
Major Economies Process on Energy Security and Climate Change Honolulu, USA (MEM 
II) 
30-31 Jan 
2008         
Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC) 
Washington DC, USA  
4-6 March 2008 
Major Economies Process on Energy Security and Climate Change  Paris, France (MEM 
III) 
17-18 April 
2008         
The Ministerial Meeting of the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and 
Sustainable Development (Gleneagles ministerial) 
Chiba City, Japan 
Final meeting of the Dialogue adopting the final report.  
14-16 March 
2008 
G8 Summit (G8 2008) 
Hokkaido Toyako, Japan  
The report of the Gleneagles Process was received at this Summit and climate change was a 
key agenda item.  
7-9 July 2008 
14th Conference of the Parties (COP 14) of the UNFCCC Poznań, Poland 1-12 Dec 2008 
15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) of the UNFCCC Copenhagen, Denmark  
The meeting where a post 2012 agreement was scheduled to be adopted but which only 
“noted” the Copenhagen Accord 
7-18 Dec 2009  
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We chose 18 intergovernmental meetings in the period 2004-2009 that were directly related to 
global climate change or energy governance (see Table 2). They fall into six categories 
(forums) that were described in the previous section: 
 
1. The biannual international renewable energy conferences (renewables conferences) 
launched by Germany in 2004   
2. The G8 Gleneagles process 2005-2008 
3. The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) meetings in 
its initial years 2005-2007 
4. The US Major Economies Meetings (MEM) 2007-2008 
5. The fifteenth meeting of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
that addressed climate change and energy for sustainable development (CSD) in 2007 
6. The annual Conferences/Meetings of the Parties to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
including negotiations on the post-2012 agreement during 2005-2009. 
 
The sample of meetings we included in the analysis is not completely covering the various 
processes, but rather aimed at including the key meetings in each process for the period in 
question.15 
The articles included in the sample were identified in the following way. For each 
meeting a search period was determined that started two days prior and ended four days after 
each meeting. The newspapers were then searched for articles in this period that included key 
words linked to the meeting in question (name of meeting, location, and “climate”, “energy”, 
or “CO2”). In special cases (for the renewables conferences and the CSD 15) additional search 
phrases such as “renewable energy” and “sustainable development” were used.16 Different 
combinations of the terms were used and the one with the best search results was chosen. All 
the articles that met these criteria were downloaded or scanned, and included in the 
quantitative analysis in Table 3?17 Articles that did not mention the meeting in question were 
not included in the sample.18  
From the larger sample a subsample of 220 more analytical articles or editorials were 
selected for the qualitative analysis according to specific criteria (see Table 3). The objective 
was to include articles that not only reported on the facts of the meeting but also included 
                                                
15 Meetings during the time period that were not included in the analysis due to time constraints were those of 
the Major Economies Forum launched in 2009 by President Obama as a continuation of the MEMs, as well as 
the 2006 and 2009 G8 meetings. These G8 meetings did not have climate change high on the agenda (check for 
Italy). In addition  the analysis did not cover the Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference (BIREC) in 
China in 2005. 
16 In most cases the papers’ own Internet archive and advanced search options were used, except for The Wall 
Street Journal where articles were retrieved via Pro Quest (a search platform for newspaper articles).  The search 
through online archives with key words was fast, but relying only on key words could lead to omitting articles. 
For example a search for articles concerning a meeting in Washington would miss articles that refer to the “the 
capital” and searching for the word “climate” could miss articles that instead refer to “global warming”. Three 
newspapers (Aftenposten, the Times and the Vientiane Times) were only or only partially available on microfilm 
or CD-ROM, which made the search time consuming but more comprehensive. 
17 Only articles that were published in the printed version of the paper were included. Some newspapers publish 
certain articles exclusively online such as the Guardian and the Wall Street Journal, but such articles were 
excluded. It is not always possible to be sure, however, that the articles in the online database had not been 
modified from the printed version of the same article.  
18 In a few cases, such as for the G8 meetings, the articles may not have been addressing climate change 
particularly but some other issue addressed by the meeting, these were still included in the quantitative sample, 
but not in the qualitative one.  
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commentary. Each paper had different types of categories of such material and judgments of 
which to include in the analysis were made on a case-by-case basis.  The number of editorials 
and opinions varied considerably between papers, with the lowest numbers in absolute and 
relative terms in Vientiane Times and the Johannesburg Star.  
 
Table 3. Selection criteria for qualitative analysis of newspaper articles 
Positive criteria Negative criteria 
• Editorials (leaders etc. without named 
author representing the official view of 
the newspaper) 
• Op-eds (similar in form and content to an 
editorial but representing the opinion of 
an individual writer who is sometimes 
but not always affiliated with the 
newspaper) 
• Specialist editorials (for example, articles 
written by the paper’s environmental 
editor) 
• Comments and Columns 
• Articles from agencies or from other 
newspapers (with a few exceptions see 
note) 
• Short news reports 
• Articles without any evaluative 
comments 
• Letters to the editor  
• Articles that discussed climate change or 
energy but did not mention the meeting 
in question 
Note: Op-eds were excluded if they were written by those that very obviously represent the government, such as 
Gordon Brown in the Guardian or an Ambassador in Aftenposten. Articles from three news agencies were 
included in the qualitative analysis: 1) Times News Network (TNN) as it is the Times of India’s own news 
agency; 2) the Xinhua news agency, the official news agency of The People’s Republic of China; 3) and the Inter 
Press Service (IPS) which is a global news agency that specializes in providing a southern/developing country 
perspective on news).  
 
The focus of the qualitative analysis was on arguments raised around the legitimacy, 
or lack of legitimacy of these forums. As a starting point for the coding we used the normative 
framework for comparing the legitimacy of international hard and soft law which was 
described in the theoretical section (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 2009).  
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The result of the quantitative analysis of total number of articles covering each meeting per 
newspaper is described in Table 4 and the total number of articles per meeting is also shown 
in Figure 1. From this analysis the following observations can be made:  
The renewables conferences received very meagre coverage; the meetings were often 
completely ignored. One striking example is that even when the renewables conference was 
hosted by the USA in 2008 and President Bush attended it the NYT did not write about it.  
 



















































































Renewables	  2004	   1	   2	   0	   1	   2	   0	   0	   0	   0	   6	  
WIREC	  2008	   1	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   3	  
G8	  Gleneagles	  2005	   4	   10	   11	   16	   4	   7	   13	   2	   7	   74	  
G8	  Heiligendamm	  2007	   2	   10	   13	   15	   6	   8	   15	   6	   7	   82	  
Gleneagles	  Dialogue	  ministerial	  2008	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   1	   1	   3	  
G8	  Hokkaido	  2008	   2	   4	   11	   7	   10	   13	   13	   -­‐	   11	   71	  
APP	  0:	  2005	   3	   0	   0	   3	   2	   0	   2	   1	   0	   11	  
APP	  1:	  2006	  Sydney	  	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   0	   2	   1	   1	   5	  
APP	  2:	  2007	  Delhi	  	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
MEM	  1:	  2007	  	  Washington	  	   1	   1	   2	   3	   3	   5	   3	   1	   1	   20	  
MEM	  2:	  2008	  Honolulu	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   2	   0	   1	   0	   3	  
MEM	  3:	  2008	  Paris	   0	   0	   0	   1	   3	   2	   0	   0	   0	   6	  
UN	  CSD	  2007	   0	   2	   3	   2	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   8	  
COP	  11:	  2005	  Montreal	   8	   14	   23	   7	   8	   8	   15	   1	   4	   88	  
COP	  12:	  2006	  Nairobi	   2	   10	   11	   2	   7	   2	   6	   1	   14	   55	  
COP	  13:	  2007	  Bali	  	   7	   13	   47	   19	   17	   13	   41	   15	   6	   178	  
COP	  14:	  2008	  Poznan	   0	   4	   14	   5	   3	   0	   5	   -­‐	   -­‐	   31	  
COP	  15:	  2009	  Copenhagen	  	   20	   31	   80	   46	   44	   30	   141	   9	   45	   446	  
Total	   51	   101	   216	   127	   109	   91	   257	   41	   97	   1090	  
 
The G8 Summits that had climate change high on the agenda were given most coverage 
in newspapers of the UK and India (the latter’s prime minister was invited these summits), 
and in the US in the case of the Hokkaido summit. The ministerial meeting that rounded off 
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the Gleneagles Dialogue was ignored by all except the three developing countries in the 
sample.  
The announcement of the APP attracted limited attention, four papers having no 
mention of it, the launch meeting was only written about in the developing country papers and 
the Guardian while the 2007 APP meeting scored zero coverage in all newspapers. Notable is 
that this low or absent coverage included the USA papers, with the Wall Street Journal not 
writing about it at all around the APP meetings, and the New York Times only covering it at 
the launch.  
The launch meeting of the MEM initiated nearly twice as many articles as the 
announcement of the APP, and got several articles in the UK and US papers as well as the 
Times of India. Subsequent meetings attracted much less attention, indeed none at all from the 
Nordic, Indian and South African papers included in the study.  
The CSD meeting was only covered in the UK papers, Aftenposten and Vientiene 
Times.  
The COP meetings of the UNFCCC received by far the most attention, at least in the 
years when crucial decisions where on the table (2005, 2007, 2009) with a gradual increase 
among these three meetings escalating towards the COP in Copenhagen which generated 446 
articles in this study.  
The newspapers with most total coverage from all meetings were the Times of India 
(257 articles) followed by the Guardian (218 articles). The paper with significantly lower 
coverage was Helsingin Sanomat (51) and Vientiane Times (42), about or less than half the 
number of papers compared to the Aftenposten and the UK and US papers in the study. 
 






The lowest coverage was consistently of the meetings that related to energy rather than 
climate change per se; the IRECs and the CSD. This can of course be a reflection of that the 
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journalists and editors were not aware of the meetings taking place, or that they considered 
them of marginal interest for the public, for example because they did not expect them to have 
any influence on the domestic and/or international arena. The attention to the APP that also 
had a more direct energy sector focus was meagre already at the launch and then the process 
dwindled into obscurity. Again, this can be due to media not knowing it took place or 
deeming it inconsequential. The G8 meetings that discussed climate change did that through a 
considerable degree linked to energy issues (for example it forged close bonds with the 
International Energy Agency to implement or follow-up some of those decisions) and these 
meetings got higher coverage in the media than the COPs of years when no major deadline 
featured in the UNFCCC negotiations. Without more data from other years it is, however, 
difficult to ascertain whether the coverage of G8 meetings is linked to the agenda items or 
who is the host. Most likely it is a combination of the two as well as other factors such as the 
scale of public demonstrations etc. (a strong feature at Gleneagles and previously in Genoa 
for example).  
The attention of the media to the UNFCCC process especially around the most important 
climate negotiations was considerable, it was certainly seen as major news. The peak around 
the Copenhagen COP is impressive, almost 450 articles with a record for a single newspaper 
in this sample coming from the Times of India who publishes 141 items on climate change in 
the three week period around the COP. The Guardian with 80 items is a good second but even 
the lowest score in Vientiane Times of 9 makes one article on average every other day. This 
must have been (one of) the most significant awareness raising events on climate change ever 
(which was already illustrated in figure 1 above). However, in order to answer our first 
research question whether media plays a role in (de-)legitimising specific forums of 
governance the results illustrated in figure 2 are perhaps more important than the total number 
of articles published in connection with the meeting. Figure 2 shows the proportion of items 
we could select for the qualitative analysis, this included editorials, op-eds and other similar 
style articles with in depth discussions on the governance process and/or outcome. Here 
numbers are significantly lower roughly between ten and twenty per cent of the items and it is 
only for the meetings of the G8 and the more important COPs that we find such items to 
analyse. Clearly these two governance arenas have been the only ones seen as important 
enough to express an opinion on in the newspaper and thus the only governance forums they 
can (de-)legitimise. The variation among the newspapers in the number of items that qualified 
for our qualitative analysis varied much less than the total number of items. The total number 
included was for HS 12, AP 17, The Guardian 44, The Times 35, the NYT 26, the WSJ 21, 
the ToI 42, the VT 7 and JS 7. From this we can conclude that there is a most active 
contribution to discourse on global climate governance in the Guardian and Times of India 
and the least contribution is in Helsingin Sanomat, the Vientiane Times and Johannesburg 
Star.19 The qualitative analysis (see below) also showed how indeed the Guardian and the 
Times of India stood out among all the newspapers included in terms of the knowledge its 
commentaries displayed on the issues at hand. If we also consider that the newspapers we 
selected were what used to be called ‘broadsheets’ or ‘serious’ morning papers that only a 
certain section of the population reads, then we can conclude that to the degree that there are 
                                                
19 According to Painter (2010) there has been a decline in number of specialist science or environmental 
journalists in the USA, for example, in 2008 CNN laid off its entire science, technology and environment staff. 
Two decades ago nearly 150 US newspapers included a science section, compared to just 20 in 2010. On the 
other hand, not all papers cut their environmental coverage, for example The Guardian in the UK doubled its 
environmental special reporters to eight and the BBC also increased its numbers of journalists covering this 
field. 
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some (hopefully informed) views on the process and outcomes of global climate governance 
in the media, it may not reach the broader public.  
 
 
Qualitative	  analysis	  results	  
Through the analysis of how the different efforts of governing climate change are ‘judged’ or 
‘evaluated’ in the newspapers we can indirectly infer what factors are considered to make the 
sources, processes and their outcomes legitimate even if the word legitimacy itself is not used. 
The source of governance is the forum in question and we discuss these in the two categories 
of minilateral forums and the multilateral forum of any note in our analysis, the UNFCCC.   
 
Legitimacy	  dimensions	  of	  minilateral	  based	  energy	  and	  climate	  change	  governance	  
The evaluative judgements of the minilateral energy and climate change governance forums, 
are few, as the quantitative result indicated with the exception of the G8 there is not much 
commentary on these in our sample. Most of the comments on these minilateral forums are 
negative, either because they have not met with some high expectation of what they should 
have achieved (such as persuading President Bush to come back to the UNFCCC 
negotiations) or because the forum itself had fundamental legitimacy flaws. So it was said of 
the various G8 declarations on climate change that they had: no (specific or mid-term) targets, 
no timetable and no base year. It was said of the G8 as a governance forum that it:  
• acts for their own interests rather than with the world’s interest; 
• is outside the established structures such as the UN; 
• discusses issues where more voices should be heard; 
• negotiates behind closed doors; 
• and can carry no conviction until China and India are welcomed plus a few more.  
 
These arguments link to a number of the components of (input) legitimacy that were part of 
our analytical framework such as tradition, participation, transparency and equity.  
The minilateral forums for international energy and climate change discussion were all 
initiated by powerful countries. They had the resources to organise them and the soft power to 
get other countries to come, even those who publicly rejected the set up (such as India in 
relation to the MEM). As discussed above our analysis shows that they were almost non-
events in the news and editorial pages of the media with the exception of the G8 meetings. 
There was thus virtually no public debate on their possible (il-)legitimacy as forums of 
authority. Among the few comments there were, the judgements spanned from “it will change 
nothing”20 to the Wall Street Journal embrace of the APP “Unlike Kyoto -- in which a 
government sets a national target for emissions, and then forces a few unlucky industries to 
make cuts -- the [Asia Pacific] Partnership gets industry execs from every sector across the 
table from relevant government ministers, and devises practical approaches to reductions.” It 
was written of President Bush’s MEM that it “pins its hopes on wishful technological 
breakthroughs and sidesteps mandatory ceilings” but when the APP was noted in a positive 
light it was because of it being a voluntary partnership that sought to address environmental 
issues through economic growth and technology, not by targets and command-and-control 
mechanisms, and because it was more acceptable to countries like China. The silence around 
                                                
20 The Times, JUNE 4, 2004, Renewable energy is nothing without the atomic option; SEARJEANT 
FINANCIAL EDITOR.  
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them can of course also mean there were no expectations indeed of them having any 
significant influence. The fact that they where new with little time to establish their credibility 
in the increasingly crowded space of international governance might have contributed.  
For the G8 that was different, despite the lack of continuous institutional structure, e.g. 
the G8 has no secretariat or standing structures; it was perceived as powerful and influential 
as it has a legacy and powerful member states. But despite this, the expectations where low. 
The Guardian wrote “German electors care deeply about the environment, which is one 
reason Ms Merkel has made global warming a focus of this summit [G8 Heiligdamm]. It also 
explains why hopes are higher for some kind of international agreement. Unfortunately, the 
odds are that it will be more watered down than a cup of service-station coffee.”21 The G8 
process face ”daunting challenges, which most of the assembled leaders are ill-positioned to 
address. At G8s, unlike other international forums where big bureaucracies represent national 
interests, personalities matter. To get results the Japanese, as hosts, must exercise impressive 
powers of leadership. Instead, there are already signs that they will pursue their usual search 
for consensus, which means the triumph of a lowest common denominator.”22 For the G8 the 
public is involved in contesting the legitimacy (demonstrations etc.) both of the process, lack 
of transparency and accountability; limited access for civil society and the fear that important 
decisions that carry implications are being decided on without any influence.  
Nonetheless, the minilateral forums do seem to have had influence. The IREC 
conferences preceded the establishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA) and are likely to have played a role in finally rounding up enough support for setting 
up such an organization (the Germans and others had lobbied for it for quite some time). The 
minilateral climate change forums may also have played a part in endorsing the minilateral 
negotiation approach used in the Copenhagen COP through discursive means (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013). 
 
Legitimacy	  dimensions	  of	  multilateral	  climate	  change	  governance	  
The multilateral forum of the UNFCCC got unprecedented attention in the run-up and during 
the COP in Copenhagen where a new agreement was supposed to be adopted and this can be 
seen as a manifestation of the broad acceptance that this is where the most important 
(influential) decisions on climate change are or should be made. Commentaries included 
evaluative judgements of both the process and (lack of) outcome of the negotiations.  
Many commentaries around the UNFCCC negotiation process concerned the final 
week of the Copenhagen COP when the established negotiation process became a massive 
logjam of conflicting red lines and mounting pressure. It is usual for COP negotiations to get 
stuck but the stakes where higher and the presence of some 120 heads of state charged the 
situation with a lot of political tension, especially as many of these leaders where not that 
familiar with the process, usually it is the ministers of environment that lead the countries 
delegations, not the prime ministers or the presidents. In a last ditch attempt to create some 
outcome in the disarray that was COP 15 United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
drafted the Copenhagen Accord on the last night of the conference. The Copenhagen Accord 
was a flimsy 3 page document void of many of the key issues of the negotiation but one 
should remember that the minilateral approach led by the US and China and few others and 
                                                
21 The Guardian, June 6 2007, G8 Summit - Tony's final talking shop, Leader. 
22 Guardian, July 7, 2008, It may seem ineffective, but we need G8 in order to face the daunting future, Max 
Hastings. 
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the attempt to reach some compromise behind closed doors was only pursued at the end of the 
conference; after the more inclusive process had resulted in a hopelessly long negotiating text, 
or the perhaps semi-inclusive (yet rather secretive) process resulting in the so called Danish 
proposal that had been vetted informally to a subgroup of countries prior to the conference 
imploded as a possible compromise. If the Copenhagen accord had been successful in 
reaching a significant deal, much of the criticism of the exclusive process against it would 
probably not surface. That is in line with Scharpf’s (Scharpf, 1999) theory of input and output 
legitimacy; if it would have delivered the goods – a new climate regime – the critique would 
have been muted.  
 
One central theme in such evaluative judgements of the outcome of the various forums is 
what we can call the basic ‘architecture’ of the agreements. This concept captures the 
discussions on: 
• the type of governance model selected that spans from internationally negotiated 
legally binding emission targets such as in the KP vs. voluntary targets pledged by 
each countries submitted to international review such as in the Copenhagen Accord 
(often referred to as targets and time-tables vs. pledge and review or top-down vs. 
bottom-up) 
• the legal character of the obligations spanning from voluntary, via politically binding 
to legally binding 
• the kind of financial incentive structure that are set up, cap and trade vs. levy etc.  
• the type of governance actors that play the central role: governments and their 
regulations or the private sector and its investments 
• the type of measures that will ‘solve’ the climate problem spanning from individual 
behavioural change to waiting for technological fixes 
• the division (or not) of countries into different categories with different types or 
degrees of obligations.  
Most of the elements relate to assumptions of what type of agreement would be most effective 
to address the climate change challenge but one can also see elements of equity being 
embedded (we discuss those separately, see below).23 These assumptions are widely diverging 
and mostly not elaborated. For example, the value of legally binding commitments is either 
taken for granted to be the best route to ensure that countries take strong action on climate 
change and thus for an effective agreement, or seen as the most ineffective and inefficient 
option. In the ToI it was claimed that the pledge and review approach without legally binding 
targets for anyone would be “bad for climate change, bad for us” (Times of India) while in the 
AP it was concluded that perhaps it is best for the climate if the world enters a continuous 
negotiation process while dropping the traditional goal to codify everything in public 
international law. None of the diverging assumptions of the (in)effectiveness of legal 
commitments are backed up with much elaboration on why legal commitments would be so 
(in)effective. One exception is the following perspective in the JS on why legal obligations do 
not matter: 
                                                
23 A few voices are raised that clearly find climate change of less importance to address, primarily in ToI and 
WSJ. For example, one article argued that the way that climate change should be addressed was to adapt to a 
warming world, pay a little to the poorest to adapt and invest a little in energy, adaptation and geoengineering. 
(Wall Street Journal Dec 22, 2009 Time for a Climate Change Plan B, Nigel Lawson) 
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“An awareness of the indissoluble kinship between human and non-human life 
needs to be instilled in popular consciousness and used as a template for moral 
action. Such a culture cannot be legislated into existence, for it is not defined 
by legal prescriptions - it does not prescribe, it affirms. It is less about what one 
ought not to do…than about the celebration of "life-centred" values and the 
weaving of those values into new patterns of individual and collective self-
understanding.”24 
 
There is also considerable variation in what constitutes a legally binding or not. In one 
commentary the UNFCCC provided binding obligations for developed countries to provide 
full incremental costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. In 
another commentary the KP was not regarded as legal and in a third one from India the 
bottom-up voluntary commitments would through international monitoring become law 
through the back door even if it had a different name.  
In some cases the newspapers capture a diversity of opinions on the architecture of 
global (energy and) climate governance, but in most cases the views expressed follow a clear 
line differentiated by country and political colour with the Guardian, the Times of India and 
the Wall Street Journal providing three very different views. The Johannesburg Star and the 
NYT is both less active in this debate and more mellow in its positions but brings in some 
perspectives not seen in the other outlets as well.  
The WSJ consistently praises the approach to climate governance of President G.W 
Bush, such as the APP which “gets industry execs from every sector across the table from 
relevant government ministers, and devises practical approaches to reductions” that is put in 
contrast with Kyoto “in which a government sets a national target for emissions, and then 
forces a few unlucky industries to make cuts”.25 It considered the G8 declaration from the 
Heiligendamm summit on climate change as a perfect example of how the world had caught 
up with the Bush approach as it e.g. set a global goal of halving emissions by 2050, invited 
the major emerging economies to join in the endeavour to reach that goal, acknowledged that 
different approaches across the world can ‘coordinate rather than compete’ and stressed that 
technology is a key to control climate change and that fossil fuels will remain the world's 
dominant source of energy and that any program support growth in developing, emerging and 
industrialized economies. In the same WSJ article Bush take on how to address climate 
change was contrasted with the “Kyoto-world” where “governments exist to create draconian 
rules, even if those dictates are disguised by ‘market’ mechanisms such as cap-and-trade”.26 
In most cases the comments on architecture are made in relation to the outcome of the 
specific meeting (or series of meetings) discussed, whether the outcome fitted the views of 
what would indeed be an effective outcome or not. This was particularly the case after the 
COP-15 meeting that resulted in the ‘noted’ Copenhagen Accord. Table 5 lists the positive 
and negative elements of the Accord mentioned in the analysed media. It should be no 
surprise that the same element is seen both as good and bad depending on who judges it.  
In a few cases the commentaries include more comprehensive, and creative proposals 
for the architecture of global climate governance, for example in NYT where the author 
Thomas Friedman suggests an “Earth Race” led by America and “built on markets, economic 
competition, national self-interest and strategic advantage” that would be “a much more self-
sustaining way to reduce carbon emissions than a festival of voluntary, nonbinding 
                                                
24 The Johannesburg Star, July 07, 2005, Environment is not for sale, Graeme Cowley.  
25 Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2007, Bush 1, Greens 0, Kimberley A. Strassel. 
26 Ibid. 
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commitments at a U.N. conference”27 or VT where a commentator suggests e.g. setting up a 
UN expert committee that should find projects to cut emissions, countries that phase out old 
industrial processes could be rewarded with better financial and trade status and an 
international fund could be set up to support new environmental technology testing.28  
 
The evaluative judgements of the minilateral energy and climate change governance forums, 
their outcomes and processes are fewer, as the quantitative result indicated with the exception 
of the G8 there is not much commentary on these in our sample. Most of the comments on 
these minilateral forums are negative, either because they have not met with some high 
expectation of what they should have achieved (such as persuading President Bush to come 
back to the UNFCCC negotiations) or because the forum itself had fundamental legitimacy 
flaws. So it was said of the various G8 declarations on climate change that they had: no 
(specific or mid-term) targets, no timetable and no base year. It was said of the G8 as a 
governance forum that it:  
• acts for their own interests rather than with the world’s interest; 
• is outside the established structures such as the UN; 
• discusses issues where more voices should be heard; 
• negotiates behind closed doors; 
• and can carry no conviction until China and India are welcomed plus a few more.  
 
These arguments link to a number of the components of (input) legitimacy that were part of 
our analytical framework such as tradition, participation, transparency and equity. For 
example, on (government) participation there is some comment on G8 and its transition 
towards being a G20.  
“[T]he more inclusive the G8 becomes, the more the membership of the inner sanctum is 
called into question. How can you have an effective discussion about the price of oil without 
the presence of Saudi Arabia, or about greenhouse gases without China? The current two-tier 
system of debate, with non-members being invited to join the feast for specific courses only, 
has its problems. One of the reasons, it was claimed, why the G8 was so keen to widen the 
discussion on greenhouse gases, becoming a G16 in the process, was to avoid confronting the 
issue of who should take the lead in cutting emissions.”29  
The same Guardian article later makes one of the clearest statements about the hierarchy of 
legitimacy in international governance in any of the articles analysed,  
”If we are moving into a different international order, we should take a cool look at 
the effectiveness of world institutions. In the first rank come the UN and bodies like 
the EU, the African Union and the Association of south-east Asian nations. But behind 
them, the annual discussions of G8 leaders add - however inadequately - to the global 
debate and do advance the discussion, however incrementally.”30  
                                                
27 New York Times, December 19, 2009, Off to the Races, Thomas L. Friedman. 
28 Vientiene Times, December 12, 2007, All eyes on Bali climate meeting, Yuo Nuo (reprinted from China 
Daily). 
29 The Guardian, July 10, 2008, Welcome to club world, Editorial. 
30 Ibid. 
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It was written of President Bush’s MEM that it “pins its hopes on wishful technological 
breakthroughs and sidesteps mandatory ceilings” but when the APP was noted in a positive 
light it was because of it being a voluntary partnership that sought to address environmental 
issues through economic growth and technology, not by targets and command-and-control 
mechanisms, and because it was more acceptable to countries like China.  
 
There is no need to discuss (the legitimacy of) something that is not expected to have any 
impact and thus the silence on the CSD, IRECs and the APPs and the attention to UNFCCC 
and G8. The attention to the G8 seems a bit double, however, with much scepticism of what it 
can deliver, and questioning the legitimacy of the institution as such due to its exclusivity for 
the most powerful, its compromise with Russia in the case of democracy as a membership 
criteria is a clear case. 
 
The Times of India stand out among the newspapers not only for having the second largest 
number of articles total, it is also rather unique in the way it directly addresses the Indian 
negotiators, cheering them on and chastising them for a poor deal as after Copenhagen. The 
following is a typical example.  
 
“The inclusive, one-country-one-vote democratic process of the UNFCCC has been 
thrown to the winds. And when countries like Brazil, China and Sudan took the lead in 
denouncing the secret goings-on among select groups that might foist a political 
declaration that hasn’t been debated and crafted by the Parties, the Secretariat and the 
Presidency fumbled. Finally, caught in his own web of words, an exasperated 
Rasmussen invoked the people outside the precincts of the conference and their 
demand for a solution, not a process! I couldn’t believe my ears! Whose solution and a 
solution for whom?  I am sure the Indian delegation would not forget the father of our 
nation, for whom the process was as important as the goal. And to the Secretariat and 
the Danish hosts I say that it is indeed the process that will ensure a transparent and 
legally binding agreement, not a political declaration.”31 
 
When it comes to analysing the climate governance from a normative ethical perspective 
Sunita Narain columnist for The Times of India together with Guardian columnist George 
Monbiot has some of the sharpest critiques of the politicians and the process for failing to 
deliver a equitable, just agreement:   
 
“It’s clear that the world needs an effective agreement to combat climate change. But 
this agreement cannot work, unless it demands that the rich nations reinvent their 
growth by substantially reducing emissions. It cannot work unless there is clarity that 
China and India and others need the right to development. But equally it recognizes 
that we can grow differently without first polluting and then cleaning up. And that this 
is not possible without the world agreeing to share the economic growth, between 
nations and between people. In this global deal, equity is a pre-requisite for an 
effective agreement, not a sweet-nothing good for the preamble only. So, we can now 
cry wolf. But this is an outcome of the ‘pragmatic global diplomacy’ that many in the 
                                                
31 The Times of India, December 18, 2009, Flop-enhagen: Team India a confused lot, Surya P Sethi. 
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government believe is the need of the day. They openly reject the idea that global 
agreements can and should be based on principles of equity or justice. They say this is 
old-fashioned and idealistic, not fit for the real world. Their world is about global 
deals that give and take. The question we in India must ask is what did we get: other 
than the official stamp of a third-class citizen of the world?”32 
 
Table	  5.	  Evaluative	  judgements	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  in	  the	  analysed	  editorials,	  op-­‐
eds	  and	  articles	  	   Good	  elements	   Bad	  elements	  Outcome	   • The	  Green	  Climate	  Fund	  
• 2C	  degree	  target	  
• The	  first	  global	  agreement	  on	  climate	  change	  
• A	  mechanism	  to	  enable	  developed	  countries	  and	  companies	  to	  offset	  their	  emissions	  by	  funding	  protection	  of	  tropical	  rain	  forests	  
• No	  quantifiable	  targets	  for	  rich	  countries	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  
• So	  bad	  that	  there	  is	  no	  risk	  anyone	  will	  think	  climate	  change	  is	  taken	  care	  	  	  	  	  
• Only	  noted,	  not	  adopted	  by	  the	  COP	  
• No	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	  scale	  up	  carbon	  finance	  
• Commitments	  on	  finance	  weakened	  by	  “lawyerly	  language”	  
• Developing	  countries	  get	  an	  ‘aid	  bonanza’	  
• No	  binding	  commitments	  on	  emission	  reductions	  
• No	  details	  on	  how	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  through	  forests	  
• No	  roadmap	  or	  timeline	  for	  further	  negotiations	  and	  brokering	  a	  legally	  binding	  deal	  
• No	  agreement	  on	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  KP	  or	  a	  successor	  	  
• No	  binding	  goals	  on	  when	  global	  emissions	  should	  peak	  and	  begin	  to	  decline	  
• Abandoning	  commitments	  made	  under	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  
• the	  entire	  international	  consensus	  built	  up	  since	  Rio	  “set	  aside	  to	  the	  
                                                
32 The Times of India, December 16, 2009, EARTH TALK - Finally, a non-paper with long-term consequences?, 
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dictate	  of	  a	  new	  world	  order	  dominated	  by	  the	  US	  and	  China”	  Process	   • The	  rich	  countries	  had	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  BRIC	  countries	  on	  more	  equal	  terms	  than	  ever	  before	  
• The	  west's	  recognition	  that	  the	  world	  will	  not	  be	  rescued	  by	  diktat,	  but	  only	  through	  genuine	  dialogue	  
• The	  highlevel	  involvement	  because	  that	  means	  it	  will	  happen	  again	  	  
• Lack	  of	  courage	  
• Developed	  countries	  belieing	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  (meant	  to	  be	  an	  open	  forum	  for	  discussion	  and	  debate)	  by	  willing	  to	  confer	  secretly	  on	  the	  Danish	  proposal	  	  
• The	  first	  COP	  wherein	  the	  well	  established	  bottom-­‐up	  multilateral	  process	  driven	  by	  the	  Parties	  was	  given	  up.  	  
 
Conclusions	  
This paper was guided by two research questions. The first concerned whether the media play 
a role in (de)-legitimising specific forums of global governance (and if so if it differs between 
countries/newspapers). The material we had to analyse enabled us to at least partially answer 
this question. Yes, the media does engage in evaluative judgements about two of the 
governance forums we analysed, the UNFCCC and the G8, to some extent on their process 
and primarily on their (lack of) outcome. However, there was considerable variation in both 
the number and the ‘quality’ or ‘depth’ of the commentaries. If everyone read the Guardian or 
the Times of India they would know a great deal about the complex challenges of global 
climate governance.  
 There is no need to discuss (the legitimacy of) something that is not expected to have 
any impact and thus the silence on the CSD, IRECs and the APPs. The attention to the G8 
seems a bit double, however, with much scepticism of what it can deliver, and questioning the 
legitimacy of the institution as such due to its exclusivity for the most powerful, lack of 
transparency, lack of attention to equity etc. What we cannot answer is, however, to what 
extent the commentaries in the newspapers contribute to initiating or strengthening debate in 
the respective countries on global climate governance (they can hardly do it on energy 
governance as those meetings were utterly ignored). Commentaries in these kinds of 
newspapers must in the end be seen as part of an elite discourse, which if it were active, 
would still strengthen the democratic input to the government’s policy in these global 
governance forums.  
The second question concerned what criteria that, explicitly or implicitly, that are used in the 
media commentaries for (de)-legitimising global governance forums and their outcomes. Here 
we can (preliminary) conclude that all of the components for procedural and substantive 
legitimacy from the normative framework we used for the analysis could be found in the 
material, with a significant dominance of the effectiveness and equity criterion. The 
commentaries want to see an effective and equitable agreement (although it varies 
considerably what is implied in those concepts). One factor that stood out in the material that 
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was not part of the framework was leadership and we will return to the material in the next 
version of the paper to analyse this in more detail.  
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